Social Protection in Lebanon and its (Non)Extension to Refugees
An informal tented settlement in Lebanon’s Bekaa valley
By Johanna-Maria Huelzer, Alli Divine | Lebanon Support
The Lebanese social protection system is fragmented, inefficient, and highly privatised. Available social services are insufficient, leaving the poorest and most vulnerable of the Lebanese population, without systematic support of their basic needs. This lack of provision exposes the urgent need for substantial reform of the official Lebanese social protection system. One of the many outgrowths of a “laissez-faire”, neo-liberal approach to governance, adopted by the Lebanese authorities, is the lack of social protection mechanisms, which has become more visible following the influx of Syrian refugees in 2011. The presence of an estimated 1.5 million Syrians refugees, and around 18,000 of other origins, is not only straining Lebanese infrastructure, and public services, but also pressurring vulnerable Lebanese communities. Negligent and exclusionary social policies, increase the insecurities of the marginalised, and subsequently fuels hostilities with the refugee population. Those resentments are present in public discourses, and used as a tool in political power struggles.
The Lebanese Government stresses that Lebanon is not a country of asylum, but a country of transit, as it is not a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Refugees are euphemistically labelled as “displaced persons”. A lack of contemporary national legislation on protection and reception of refugees, spares the government the responsibility, and accountability, in regard to the provision of social protection to “displaced populations” present in the country. Moreover, vulnerable Syrian refugees are left with two options, either rely on themselves, or on local and international NGOs, once again facilitating the emergence and mobilisation of non-state actors, in the absence of government provided services. While poor Lebanese, and Syrian refugees, work primarily in the informal labour market, Syrians are already restricted to specific sectors and occupations, as informed by the Ministry of Labour.
This blog post highlights the insufficiencies in the Lebanese social protection system, and how they extend to almost 1.5 million Syrian refugees in the country.
Public Social Protection in Lebanon
In Lebanon, official social protection policies are still in a “nascent stage”. Most were developed as ad hoc responses to crises and emergency situations, as such they do not embody a sustainable long-term strategy, or systematic implementation. These circumstances have assigned a prominent, yet non-exclusive, role to private charities, local organisations, and INGOs in the provision of welfare, and social security.
On the administrative level, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) is in charge of the coordination of social protection, and the contracting of CSO, and NGO partners. Social Development Centres (SDCs) exist in different regions of Lebanon, tasked with the implementation of MoSA’s policies on the ground. In some governorates, SDCs are responsible for extending their health and education services to Syrian refugees. Unprepared for the challenges associated with the increased influx, these facilities are severely strained, and consequently overwhelmed.
The two main public social protection programmes are the National Social Security Fund and the Emergency National Poverty Targeting Program:
For wage-earners, employers, and government bodies, the “National Social Security Fund” (NSSF), is the largest independent public social insurance institution in Lebanon, administered by the Ministry of Labor, and the Council of Ministers. It covers Sickness and Maternity Security, Emergency Work and Occupational Diseases Guarantee, a Family and Educational Benefits System and End-of-Service provision. All formal employers are obliged to register their employees with the NSSF, excluded individuals are those who are either unemployed, or self-employed. Nevertheless, there are no enforcement mechanisms to ensure the registration of employees: almost half of the employees in the private sector (40%) are not registered. Furthermore, the fact that 30% of the overall formal workforce is self-employed, sheds light on the NSSF’s narrow scope of coverage. Additionally, employers can easily take advantage of misinformation, and the precarious situation of their employees, to avoid the additional costs of 22.5% to each wage to be paid to the NSSF.
Although NSSF registration does not legally depend on residency, or citizenship, it only applies to the legal labour force. Consequently, the majority of poor Lebanese, as well as Syrian refugees, are by default not eligible, as they mostly pursue informal labour. Registration rates of Syrian migrant workers before 2011 were traditionally very low, and in the face of the current workforce surplus, the registration for social protection by the NSSF seems unattainable for Syrian workers in Lebanon. While Palestinian refugees from Lebanon have been granted access to the End-of-Service provisions of the NSSF in 2010, they are still excluded from the remaning services of the fund, and the potential extension to Palestine refugees from Syria is unlikely.
Initiated by the Council of Ministers in 2011, and with an increase in the funding provided by the World Bank in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the 2014 Emergency National Poverty Targeting Program (ENPTP) was launched by the Lebanese Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR. Targeting “extremely poor” Lebanese households, it is geared towards those excluded from eligibility for the NSSF, and is structured to provide partial medical bill payments, school fee waivers, free books, and food assistance.
For inclusion in the programme, households need to proactively approach a Social Development Centre and go through several assessment steps before being granted assistance. Contradictory to its design, as a service for the most vulnerable Lebanese populations, these groups face rigid barriers to inclusion in the ENPTP. Enrolment in the programme depends on self-initiative, initial knowledge of the programme, and on the provision of necessary documents as a prerequisite. Research reveals that public perceptions of the programme are negative, with selection procedures reported as lacking transparency or consistency. Indeed, concerns such as outdated and restrictive eligibility indicators, and social stigmatisation of participants, have been voiced by applicants
Roles of Local and International NGOs in Social Service Provision in Lebanon
As a consequence of the denial of refugee status to Syrians, by the Lebanese authorities, they are not legally bound to provide them with social protection of any kind. In doing so, they are hindering their access to legal redress, and livelihood opportunities. The absent role of the state in the provision of public social protection for refugees, is partly substituted by the activism of a wide range of non-state actors. The most prominent among them are relevant UN agencies, such as UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP. To be able to provide at least the most basic assistance, UNHCR has institutionalised its protection and humanitarian aid provision mechanisms, partially based on tenuous agreements with the Lebanese government. Nevertheless, UNHCR’s work in protecting, and supporting refugees in Lebanon, is a balancing act due to the politically sensitive climate.The situation is officially conceived as a humanitarian crisis, not as a refugee crisis. This is exemplified by the fact that the Lebanese Government had asked the UNHCR to halt the registration of Syrians as of May 2015, in addition to deregistering those who had entered the country after the beginning that year, thereby not only denying them access to social services, but also to the legal recognition of a refugee status. Therefore, even institutionalised social service practices by UN agencies have to operate under the banner of humanitarian aid.
Generally, around 40% of the income of refugee households consist of humanitarian assistance by UN agencies. This includes in-kind assistance, as well as cash-based ones. Due to the protraction of the Syrian crisis, dwindling donor funding, and the rise of costs of living, addressing livelihood concerns have become unpredictable to address. Consequently, more than half of the Syrian refugee population is unable to meet basic needs of food, health and shelter, with household expenditures below the Minimum Expenditure Basket threshold of $2.90 per person per day.
Both refugees, and vulnerable Lebanese populations, are substantially dependent on private actors for the provision of social services. In addition to international NGOs and UN agencies, local charity and faith-based organisations, play a central role in welfare provision. Indeed, a wide range of different actors, with different grades of institutionalisation, are involved. Local charities, for example, play a crucial role in aiding poor households. In situations of response to short-term crises, government bodies, and international NGOs, can push for their involvement, similarly with faith-based organisations, and those affiliated to political parties. As Lebanese politics are often based on the provision of favours, and other clientelistic practices, providing social services can be a tool to maintain and stabilise political constituencies.
Nevertheless, research shows that poor Lebanese increasingly feel neglected by NGOs who appear to turn their attention and resources towards refugees instead.
Room For Improvement
As previously discussed the Lebanese social protection system presents significant insufficiencies, and hindrances, leaving vulnerable Lebanese populations, and Syrian refugees, without basic social securities, also excluding them from accessing basic subsistence. Host community fatigue is further exacerbated by public discourses focusing on the “crowding out” of vulnerable Lebanese from the social services provided by NGOs, and on the oversaturation of the labour market. Moreover, populit opinions neglecting the root causes of the problem in favor of highlighting its outcomes, further hazes the role played by governmental mismanagement. The socio-economic situation of vulnerable populations is more affected by the state of readiness of public infrastructure, and the mismanagement by Lebanese authorities, than by the presence of refugees, and the “burden” they pose to the country’s resources. The lack of accountability in the provision of public goods by the Lebanese government, prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, has ultimately reached its peak with their influx. Furthermore, neglective governmental practices are reflected in present insufficient and narrow social protection policies.
The protests have been started in Lebanon since October 17, 2020, in an unprecedented geographic spread, and deeply driven by demands to access socio-economic rights. The demand for better livelihood opportunities, social protection, justice and accountability, not only reflect the grievances of refugees, and the most vulnerable Lebanese, but also represent the central demands of the social movement. Hopes for policy change, have been halted by the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the terrible blast in Beirut that once again seem to push the country in seeking short-term humanitarian solutions rather than rights-based policy reforms.